Money, Morals, or Might? Explaining which Countries Welcome China's Rise

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Abstract

Across the globe, states vary greatly in the degree to which they are willing to support a rising China's interests. How can we explain this variation? Recent studies look to economic dependence theories for answers, but the conclusions of these studies are mixed. We argue that states' accommodative postures are likely to be contingent on the position of a particular country within the contemporary US-led global order. We follow others in characterizing the contemporary order as multi-dimensional, focusing in particular on a liberal political development dimension, a liberal economic dimension, and a US-led security hierarchy as being central features of the current global order. We hypothesize that countries more marginalized from different dimensions of the current order will be more likely to welcome the rise of a new power (like China) that might challenge established norms, and we further predict that a country marginalized from a particular dimension of order will be especially likely to support China in cases where Chinese behavior directly challenges the norms associated with that dimension of order. Employing novel measures of different dimensions of contemporary order, we test this expectation on a data set of countries' willingness to support China's 2005 Anti-Secession Law, its 2008 crackdown in Tibet, its position on the 2016 South China Sea UN Tribunal, and its recent policies in Xinjiang. Our findings indicate that while integration into the liberal political development order strongly and consistently predicts who accommodates China, the other dimensions of order are weaker predictors of state behavior.

The People's Republic of China's (PRC's) stunning rise as a great power is reshaping international politics in a variety of ways. As the world's largest trading state, China's economic footprint is immense, and the massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seems certain to reinforce Beijing's importance to the global economy. Meanwhile, China is increasingly emerging as an important military power, with defense spending only trailing that of the United States. And the PRC has been increasingly active on the global stage, creating new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) even as it more assertively defends its maritime claims in the East and South China Seas and its territorial claims over Taiwan.

Against this backdrop, countries across the world clearly differ greatly in the extent to which they welcome China's emergence as a great power (e.g., Broz et al. 2018), and they vary considerably in how supportive they are of a rising China's interests and behaviors, across a range of issue areas. Some countries, for instance, have been more willing than others to challenge assertive PRC military actions in the South China Sea, and scholars have pointed more broadly to considerable variation in how far countries in East Asia are willing to go to balance against growing PRC military power (Kang 2007; Ross 2006; Ross 2019). Similarly, although many countries have been keen to participate in PRC-led economic initiatives such as BRI and the AIIB, others have been more circumspect, and the United States and Japan refused even to join the AIIB. And countries across the globe vary greatly in their willingness to criticize China for human rights abuses, such as the forced detention of Uighurs in large-scale internment camps. While a number of countries have been openly critical of PRC actions in Xinjiang, others have been silent, and dozens of countries recently have gone so far as to defend China's policies in Xinjiang in an open letter. How can we explain this variation?

Understanding countries' responses to China's rise and variation therein is an important undertaking in its own right, as it provides insight into which countries are likely to gravitate in Beijing's direction as—and if—China's power continues to grow. This question also has the potential to shed light on how power transitions unfold in interna-

tional politics, more broadly. Which countries are most likely to welcome the rise of a new great power and which are most likely to resist such a rise?[1]

In this article, we ask: under what conditions is an individual country likely to be more or less supportive of China's actions and interests? Building on several recent studies,[2] we hypothesize that countries more marginalized from different dimensions of the contemporary US-led international order will be more likely to support Chinese actions and interests across a range of issue-areas. Focusing in particular on three distinct dimensions of the contemporary international order–a US-led security hierarchy; a liberal international economic order; and a liberal political development order–we argue that countries which are more marginalized from these dimensions (for instance, countries rejecting key norms associated with a particular dimension) should tend to welcome the rise of a new great power that might in the future challenge existing norms. Such countries also have incentive to curry favor with a powerful country that might provide benefits denied in the current order, or that might shield states from sanctions when they violate key norms.

To test our hypotheses, we examine cross-national variation in the willingness of individual countries to support China on issues pertaining to four areas that China has long emphasized constitute important national interests: Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea. We find that countries which are more marginalized from the liberal political development dimension of international order are consistently the most likely to support China's position across these different issues. In some cases marginalization from the liberal economic dimension of order is also a strong predictor of behavior; marginalization from the US-led security hierarchy, on the other hand, never emerges as a strong

[1]Given the importance of this topic, it is not surprising that a growing literature has explored why some countries are more supportive of Chinese interests than others. This literature has identified a number of potentially important factors in this regard, including: China's increasing military capabilities (Ross 2006, 2019); the pull of China's dynamic economy (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013; Kastner 2016); shared identity (Kang 2007); dissatisfaction with the contemporary international order (Broz et al. 2018; Liao and McDowell 2016), and political similarities with the PRC (Strüver 2016). On how countries in Asia are responding to China's rise, see also Ikenberry 2016; Medeiros et al. 2008; Chan 2012; Goh 2016; Liff 2016.

[2]Especially Broz et al. 2018; Liao and McDowell 2016; and Johnston 2019.

predictor. We further find some evidence that a given dimension of order is a stronger predictor of behavior, relative to other dimensions, to the extent an issue directly relates to that particular dimension. We conclude with suggestions for further development.

Theorizing National Responses to China's Rise

In this section, we develop a theory to explain which countries, under what conditions, will be likely to support Chinese actions and interests on issues Beijing cares about.[3] What explains, for instance, the recent decision by dozens of countries to sign a letter in support of China's policies in Xinjiang? What explains the decision by some countries not to sign that letter even as they have, in the past, expressed support for China on other issues such as Taiwan?[4]

Our theory builds on some recent studies which have found that a country's integration into the contemporary liberal international order may shape its propensity to be more or less supportive of China in particular contexts. Liao and McDowell (2016) find, for instance, that state preferences concerning the US-led international order (as captured by estimates of their ideal point distances from the United States and China in the United Nations General Assembly) shape state decisions on whether to include the Renminbi as a reserve currency. Similarly, Broz et al. (2018) find that countries with reason to be aggrieved with the current US-led international economic order—such as countries that have experienced greater financial instability in recent decades—have been more welcoming of Chinese leadership on economic issues, and in particular have shown greater interest in China's BRI. There are good reasons to believe that countries

[3]China's national interests, as is true for any country, are diverse and contested: that is, different actors in China have different conceptions of what constitutes the national interest, and how the country's priorities (such as development and regional security) should be ranked. Among external observers, there is also considerable uncertainty about the expansiveness of China's long-term aims, such as whether the PRC seeks regional or even global hegemony. Nevertheless, there is fairly wide agreement that Chinese leaders at a minimum view the PRC's principle national interests as including regime stability; territorial integrity; and continued economic development (See, for instance, Sutter 2008; Shirk 2007; Christensen 2002/3; Zheng 2005; Saunders 2006). Although the scope of China's "core" interests relating to territory has been the subject of some debate among analysts, PRC officials have repeatedly and unambiguously emphasized that they view Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang as constituting core national interests in this regard. See, e.g., Swaine 2011. The current Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping also appears to view enhanced national status as an important Chinese interest; see, for instance, Pu 2017.

[4]On the Xinjiang letter, see Putz 2019.

which reject key norms embedded in the current US-led order, or which harbor grievances against that order, should tend to gravitate toward a rising power that also questions current norms and may one day be in a position to reconstruct them. For instance, states that are unhappy with current institutions may believe that supporting Chinese leadership will facilitate China's ability to reform those institutions by signaling broader support for PRC objectives.[5] In short, what might be termed a "dissatisfaction with US-led order" hypothesis represents a good start for making sense of variation in cross-national approaches to China: its underlying logic is reasonable, and scholars have shown that it captures important variation on key issues such as Renminbi internationalization.

Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction hypothesis would benefit from further development for three inter-related reasons. First, it is clear that individual countries sometimes support China on one issue even as they criticize or even more actively try to undercut China on other issues. Australia, for instance, was willing to join China's AIIB despite US pressure to stay out, but Canberra has also been critical of China on other issues such as human rights.[6] A theory examining patterns of support for China would ideally be able to account for this sort of within-country variation, either by allowing dissatisfaction with the US-led order to vary depending on the issue at hand, or by allowing the salience of the variable to vary depending on the issue at hand (or both).

Second, the degree to which China's interests and behavior are at odds with global norms is itself the subject of considerable debate, and likely also varies across different issues (and sometimes even within particular issue areas).[7] For instance, on the issue of development finance, China's construction of the AIIB appears largely consistent with

[5]Ikenberry (2008: 30) notes that one feature of today's Western order that makes it especially durable is the "coalition-based character of its leadership." For a rising power to challenge the contemporary order, it would need to overtake not only the United States, but the United States in combination with the other industrialized democracies that stand at the core of the current order. Backing China on some issue, then, could help signal the broad support that would ultimately be required for a rising state like China to challenge existing arrangements and bring about change.

[6]For example, Australia signed the recent letter to the president of the UN Human Rights Council criticizing China's repressive policies in Xinjiang. See Putz 2019.

[7]On the current academic and policy debate concerning whether China is—or is likely to become—a revisionist power, see: Johnston 2003; Johnston 2019; Chan 2008; Kastner and Saunders 2012; Kastner et al. 2019; Mastro 2019; Mearsheimer 2001; Friedberg 2011; and Lim 2015.

existing norms, and indeed the institution is modeled on other development banks and has cooperated with the World Bank on specific projects.[8] Conversely, the BRI is a unilateral undertaking that operates outside of those multilateral institutions. While it seems clear why a country that is broadly dissatisfied with the current liberal order might welcome China's leadership in launching the BRI (as Broz et al. 2018 demonstrate), it is less clear whether such a country would similarly welcome China's leadership in establishing an institution, like AIIB, that dovetails with current global financial norms. Again, a theory of patterns of national support for China would ideally differentiate between different types of Chinese behavior and varying Chinese interests that might be more or less consistent with contemporary global norms.

Finally, the "US-led international order" (or similar variants such as "US-led liberal order"; "liberal international order"; or "rules-based order") is itself a contested term that may have limited utility as an overarching concept. Although it has become widely used in recent years (Johnston 2019), what scholars and policymakers mean when they use this term is not always clear. Indeed, the literature is filled with different definitions of "international order" itself,[9] and as Glaser (2019) observes, different scholars have had differing conceptualizations concerning which institutions and norms should be included in the liberal international order. Given these issues, some scholars have found it more useful to disaggregate the broad concept of a "US-led international order" into a set of constituent parts. For instance, Foot and Walter (2011) decompose the current global order into a set of issues (such as financial regulation, nuclear nonproliferation, etc.) and their associated normative frameworks. Nathan (2016) and Kastner et al. (2019) likewise examine China's approach to a set of issue-specific regimes rather than toward an overriding order, both noting that China's behavior tends to vary considerably in different domains. And Johnston (2019) goes even further by arguing that, rather than focus on a single international order, it is more useful to think in terms of several (in his framework,

[8] On the degree to which AIIB should be seen as dovetailing with existing financial institutions versus challenging them see Chin 2016 and Kastner et al. 2019.

[9] For a good discussion of different conceptualizations of international order, see Foot and Walter 2011.

eight) different issue-specific orders (such as a trade order, or a political development order) that exist simultaneously.

There are thus a number of potential limitations associated with a focus on dissatisfaction with the US-led order as an explanatory variable that leads countries to be more or less supportive of China. We believe that disaggregating the broad concept of a US-led international order, in line with the above studies, is productive for several reasons. First, states can be more or less integrated into different regimes often associated with the current liberal order. An individual country might fully embrace a norm of trade openness and its associated institutions, even as it rejects liberal human rights norms. Disaggregation thus allows for within-country variation in dissatisfaction with the established order depending on the specific issue being considered; in turn, it has the potential to offer some leverage in explaining why some countries express support for China in some contexts but not in others. Second, disaggregation likewise allows for China's approach to order to vary across different contexts. China itself clearly buys into some norms often attributed to the current US-led order (such as sovereignty norms) even as it rejects others such as liberal human rights norms. Thus, disaggregation opens the door to variation in state support for China that is driven by variation in China's own approach to the international order across different contexts. Finally, disaggregation allows us to explore which dimensions of the current order are most salient in driving state behavior. Do states tend to gravitate toward China primarily as a consequence of grievances with the current US-led liberal economic order or are grievances with other dimensions of order more salient?

As an initial cut, we choose to focus on three facets of contemporary global order in which the United States has played an especially important role. The first is a liberal international economic order, characterized by normative commitment to free trade and, increasingly, financial openness. The order dates to the end of the Second World War, and includes institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Bretton Woods institutions. Although membership in key institutions is quite broad (with

membership in the GATT/WTO having expanded greatly over the decades since its establishment), the degree to which countries are fully integrated into or marginalized from this order varies considerably. Some countries (such as North Korea) reside almost completely on the fringes, neither subscribing to the key norms associated with the order, nor participating in the key institutions. Others are formal members of the principal institutions, but may be more or less accepting of key norms, particularly relating to financial openness. Malaysia, for instance, moved swiftly to impose capital controls during the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, despite international advice and pressure to the contrary. And, as Broz et al. (2018) observe, some countries—such as those that have suffered financial crises—have reason to hold grievances against the order. Thus, while adherence to this order varies, so too do the economic benefits countries derive from it.

The second order is a US-led security hierarchy (Lake 2009), where Washington has constructed a vast network of formal and informal security ties with countries across the globe to protect its interests. The US-led security hierarchy dates to the construction of what Ikenberry (2001, p. 170) refers to as a "containment order" following the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II. Although originally constructed to balance against Soviet power, the US-led security hierarchy has endured since the end of the Cold War. We follow Lake (2009) in conceptualizing hierarchy as being present when one actor possesses authority over another; in turn, a country occupies a more subordinate role in the US-led security hierarchy to the degree that the US has more authority to make decisions concerning the security of that country. For many countries in the world, of course, the US possesses no such authority—these countries, including contemporary Russia or China, have what Lake refers to as "diplomatic" security relations with the US and should be thought of as residing outside the US-led hierarchy. At the other end of the continuum, Washington makes all important security decisions for some countries (which Lake describes as being in a "protectorate" relationship with the US). Examples include contemporary Micronesia and post-World War II era Japan. In between lies a range of relationships that are more or less hierarchical depending on how much authority Washington holds regarding security decisions. Lake suggests that, in concrete terms,

factors such as the number of troops the US deploys to a particular country and the degree to which it has alliances independent of an alliance with the US determine the degree to which that country's security relationship with the US is hierarchical.

The third order is a liberal political development order, characterized by normative commitment to democracy and human rights, and by institutions such as the major international human rights conventions and various governmental and non-governmental organizations that promote democracy. This is an order that has become more clearly defined in recent decades, particularly since the end of the Cold War (see Mearsheimer 2019; Johnston 2019). However, the order remains highly contested, with many countries rejecting some (or in some cases, nearly all) of the order's key norms and institutions. Many countries have refused to ratify key human rights treaties such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (including, in this case, the United States), and recent years have seen a global retreat of democracy (Diamond 2019).

Future analysis could, of course, consider additional dimensions of contemporary world order, such as the orders identified by Johnston (2019) that center on the environment or social development. We limit our focus to the three identified above in part to keep the analysis manageable, but also because they capture key features of contemporary international order that are highlighted by a range of scholars.[10] The three dimensions also happen to dovetail reasonably well with extant studies which have found military/security factors (Ross 2006, 2019), economic factors (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013; Broz et al. 2018), and identity and normative factors (Kang 2007) to be important determinants of cross-national variation in how countries approach a rising China.

We hypothesize that countries more marginalized from any of these three orders

[10]Ikenberry (2001, p. 170), in addition to a security-related "containment order" structured around balancing the power of the Soviet Union, also identifies an "American-led liberal political order" that was "built around economic openness, political reciprocity, and multilateral management." Kupchan (2014) highlights several logics of the current US-led international order, including variegated security architecture, economic openness, and commitment to egalitarianism and democracy. Mearsheimer (2019) characterizes the contemporary liberal order as including commitments to democratization, economic openness, and multilateralism. And Glaser (2019, p. 56), though critiquing the utility of the concept, characterizes the liberal international order as holding liberal values and as including security institutions such US-led alliances, multilateral economic institutions such as the IMF, and the UN.

should be more likely, all else equal, to be supportive of Chinese actions and interests. Countries that are marginalized from the international economic order—such as countries which have derived relatively few benefits from the order or which have suffered as a result of financial crises or other shocks—are likely to look at contemporary China, which has become a trade juggernaut and is increasingly a central player in FDI markets and aid regimes, as a potential economic opportunity. These countries, in turn, should be reluctant to challenge Chinese interests across a range of issue-areas, for fear of putting actual or potential economic ties with China at risk.[11]

Countries firmly integrated into the US security hierarchy, meanwhile, are likely to view China's growing military power with some alarm—as potentially undercutting the ability of Washington to continue to provide security into the future. Such countries may thus be reluctant to lend support and legitimacy to a rising China's actions and interests, out of fear that doing so will hasten its rise. On the other hand, countries residing outside the US-led security hierarchy—countries that do not rely on Washington to provide security—have less reason to be concerned about China's rise, and thus have less to lose by showing support for China. Indeed, many such countries will welcome the rise of a China that might someday challenge US primacy, and so have reason to want to signal support to a rising China.

Finally, countries residing on the fringes of the liberal political development order, especially countries that actively violate global human rights norms, may wish to curry

[11]One recent study (Fuchs and Klann, 2013) has found, for instance, that countries that challenge China by hosting the Dalai Lama pay a price for doing so, in terms of reduced trade with China. Likewise, Dreher et. al (2018) show that China's official development assistance (ODA) is driven by foreign policy considerations, with countries that are more aligned with China in voting behavior in the UNGA, or that are more acquiescent on the Taiwan issue, receiving greater ODA flows. And Davis et al. (2019) find that a country's political relationship with China (as measured by bilateral tensions captured by events data, as well as voting behavior in the UNGA) has a significant effect on Chinese imports from that country, an effect that is concentrated within imports by the state-controlled sector of the economy. More generally, anecdotal evidence abounds where countries accommodate Chinese concerns on a particular issue to avoid undercutting economic ties with China. For instance, after China-UK relations soured following a meeting between Prime Minister David Cameron and the Dalai Lama in 2012, Cameron shifted course and agreed to distance himself from the Dalai Lama in the future. See: "David Cameron to Distance Britain from Dalai Lama During China Visit," *The Guardian*, 30 November 2013: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/30/david-cameron-distance-britain-dalai-lama-china-visit.

favor with a rising China that might—in the future—be able to shield them from sanction, and provide benefits denied to them in the current system. For example, countries that violate human rights norms sometimes face sanctions from the United States and other Western countries. As such, they have a clear incentive to seek a favorable relationship with a rising power like China that might challenge those norms, in the hopes that the rising state will use its growing international clout to block or water down sanctions. Thus, our initial three hypotheses are as follows:

> **H1**: Countries that are more marginalized from the liberal international economic order will be more likely to support Chinese behavior and interests, ceteris paribus.
>
> **H2**: Countries that are less integrated in the US-led security hierarchy will be more likely to support Chinese behavior and interests, ceteris paribus.
>
> **H3**: Countries that are more marginalized from the liberal political development order will be more likely to support Chinese behavior and interests, ceteris paribus.

As an empirical matter, we are also interested in assessing whether these different dimensions of international order have similar impact on how countries respond to a rising China, or whether one is especially important as a driver of state behavior.

Beyond the general expectations outlined above, we also believe that the willingness of individual states to support China will vary depending on two additional factors. First, we expect that marginalization from any one of the dimensions of international order outlined above will be most salient in predicting state support for Chinese actions and interests that relate directly to issues associated with that dimension. For instance, if we return to Broz et al.'s (2018) finding that countries with grievances against the liberal international economic order will be most likely to welcome Chinese leadership, we suspect this finding will be strongest when examining cross-national variation in support for Chinese economic initiatives such as BRI, and will be weaker in other domains, such as Chinese efforts to rally support behind its policies in Xinjiang. Second, we expect that the predictive power of a state's marginalization from any one dimension of order will vary

depending on the degree to which China's own interests and behavior are at odds with the norms associated with that dimension. More specifically, if China's actions are consistent (or even help to bolster) that order's norms, then countries rejecting the norms associated with that dimension will have less reason to rally behind China, while countries that are more integrated into that dimension of order will have less reason to oppose Chinese actions. This is a dynamic that is perhaps most apparent with the AIIB, where many countries that are highly integrated into the contemporary liberal international economic order, such as the UK, Germany, and Australia, expressed support for China's initiative by joining the new bank. When combined, these two factors suggest that, for instance, marginalization from the US security hierarchy will be a stronger predictor of support for China, relative to a state's marginalization from other dimensions of order, in instances where Chinese behavior challenges US security interests. Alternatively, marginalization from the liberal political development order will be a stronger predictor of support for China in cases where Chinese behavior challenges or is at odds with political development norms. We can distill these expectations into a fourth hypothesis, as follows:

> **H4**: Marginalization from a particular order will more strongly predict a country's support for China (relative to marginalization from other dimensions of order) to the degree that a given Chinese action or interest more strongly challenges that particular order.

Measuring Support

To measure `Support` of Chinese interests, we focus on the positions individual countries have taken in response to high profile events regarding Taiwan, Tibet, the South China Sea (SCS), and Xinjiang; all of which the PRC views as "core," or at least important, national interests.

Anti-Secession Law directed against Taiwan (2005). In March, 2005, the PRC's National People's Congress passed an Anti-Secession Law (ASL), which indicates that China will use "non-peaceful means" in the event of Taiwan's "secession" from China.

The PRC has long claimed Taiwan as rightfully a part of China, and the law passed at a time of considerable tension in China-Taiwan relations. While some countries, such as the United States, were critical of Beijing for passing the law, many other countries issued statements in support of the law. Data on individual country responses to the law come from Kastner (2016). We err on the side of caution and create a dichotomous indicator of support by collapsing his strong and moderate support levels into one category. All others are counted a non-supporters.

Tibetan Crackdown (2008). In March 2008, widespread unrest erupted in Greater Tibet. Protesters targeted state property and, in some cases, civilian property—such as shops owned by ethnic Chinese. Eighteen civilians and at least one security official were killed during the March and April unrest. Beijing implemented a tough crackdown in response, deploying upwards of 4,000 People's Armed Police to the region (Bonnin 2009: 69). The PRC arrested thousands, placed tight restrictions on communication, and banned tourists and most reporting from the affected areas. Although some countries urged Beijing to act with restraint, many other countries issued official statements supporting the PRC's position during the crackdown. Here again we use data from Kastner (2016) and collapse his three-way measure into a dichotomous indicator of support or non-support for China's actions.

South China Sea Tribunal (2016). Brought by the Philippines against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) compulsory dispute resolution process in 2013[12], the South China Sea Arbitration examined and ruled on multiple issues in the disputed waters. Chief among them was the legality of China's 'nine-dashed line' claim. Prior to the case, the PRC's 1996 ratification of UNCLOS and incorporation of UNCLOS text into domestic legislation was viewed as a win for the engagement doctrine (Kardon 2018: 5). Yet almost immediately after the case's initiation, China submitted a note verbale to the court declaring its intent to not

[12]See *The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China*, PCA CASE Repository Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No. 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), `https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1503`, accessed Aug 13, 2018.

participate and ignore any of its future judgments as non-binding.[13] China's behavior was notable not for its decision to renounce the tribunal but its unofficial campaign to undermine the arbitration proceedings and its official diplomatic efforts to garner support for its position on the illegitimacy of the tribunal from other states.[14] As Kardon (2018: 3) argues, China's diplomatic efforts were not simply about delegitimizing the arbitration procedure, but "...seeking to champion an UNCLOS with Chinese characteristics."

To code support for China in this case, we begin by using Wang and Chen (2016) and a report from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative as initial reference points.[15] We then conducted searches using NexisUni and Google to validate or reject the initial list, as well as to add new entries, based on the following criteria. Only statements that represent an official position of the country in question were coded. Examples include a foreign ministry press release, a statement issued by a ministry official, or a statement issued by a country's president. We exclude statements made by individual members of a country's legislature, those issued by officials not associated with Foreign Affairs, or made in an unofficial capacity. The dependent variable `Support` is binary. In instances where statements could not be verified by more than one source we also coded a separate, less conservative measure (included in the replication files). We use the more stringent measures in the models below. Any country that issued an official independent or joint statement with the PRC expressing explicit support for China's position is coded as a 1, all others are coded as a 0. In a tally of countries that supported its position, Wang and Chen (2016) used a liberal definition of support, counting any country which signed onto a document with a clause related to China's position on the tribunal. For example, they name 22 Arab nations supporters because they signed the Doha Declaration of the 7^th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States which included a single, tangential clause on the SCS. We exclude such countries.

[13]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines*, `http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml`, accessed Aug 13, 2018.

[14]For greater detail of China's multi-faceted efforts to derail the arbitration see Kardon (2018: 27-29).

[15]'Arbitration Support Tracker,' *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, `https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/`

Uighur Repression in Xinjiang (2013–Present). Unrest and separatist sentiments have been a historical mainstay in China's Western province of Xinjiang since well before the PRC's founding in 1949. However, in recent decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has increasingly implemented policies aimed at Sinicizing the region, stoking resentment among the local Muslim Uighur populace. In response, radicalized Uighurs have carried out over a dozen terrorist attacks across China, but mainly in Xinjiang, since 1990 according to official government accounts. Since Xi Jinping's ascension to power, the CCP's governance strategy in Xinjiang has pivoted from an emphasis on economic development and poverty alleviation to Mao-era 'education reform through labor' (*laogai*) (Seymour and Anderson 1998). Adrian Zenz (2018) traces the nascent stages of the re-education campaign to 2013 and has identified 78 labor camps through province-level budget reports and satellite imagery. He estimates the total internment figure of Muslims in Xinjiang to be slightly over one million, or an internment rate of 11.5 percent for Uighurs and Kazakhs (2018: 123).

Despite increasing international coverage and criticism of the situation in Xinjiang by media outlets and human rights organizations beginning in 2016, the Chinese government continued to deny the detention centers' existence until late 2018. Facing an upcoming Universal Period Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council, the PRC shifted its stance, acknowledging and justifying its policies.[16] In December 2018 and January 2019, the PRC began inviting foreign diplomats to visit select facilities and seeking international support. Later, in July 2019, after 22 countries signed a letter to the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights calling for the closure of the detention centers, 37 countries signed a separate letter that defended China's policies in Xinjiang (Putz 2019).

We followed the same approach as in the South China Sea to collect data, this time anchoring our searches with the above mentioned letter. Our coding scheme is as follows. Any country that sent a diplomatic delegation to Xinjiang at China's behest and is on the record making positive or supportive statements of the situation there is coded 1.

[16] "China says Human Rights Watch report on Xinjiang suppression 'full of prejudice and distorted facts'", *Hong Kong Free Press*, September 11, 2018.

Countries that signed a July 2019 letter of endorsement circulated by China are also code as 1 (see Putz 2019).[17] Countries that 1) sent delegations but for which there is no recorded statements by officials; 2) who were invited but their attendance cannot be confirmed; 3) are openly critical of China; or 4) took no position are coded as 0.

Figure 1 provides a descriptive overview of the variables.[18] The top plot shows support counts within and across each case as well. China received support from 81 countries regarding the ASL, 70 countries during the Tibetan Crackdown, only 9 during the SCS Tribunal[19], and 42 in response to its policies in Xinjiang. After breaking down the counts across cases, we can see significant variation in which countries support China under different circumstances. For instance, 23 countries limited their support to the ASL, 13 to Tibet, 6 to Xinjiang, and 2 to the SCS. Notably, only one country backs China on all four issues.

Indexing the Orders

Our main independent variables consist of three indices that capture the degree to which a particular country is more or less integrated into different elements of international order: `Liberal Norms` measures integration into the liberal political development order, `Economic Integration` measures integration into the liberal international economic order, and `Security Hierarchy` measures integration into the US-led security hierarchy.

For `Liberal Norms`, we use the *liberal component index* from the V-Dem Dataset v9 (Coppedge et al. 2019) which is a $[0, 1]$ index that averages equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on

[17]The original letter includes 37 countries; however Qatar retracted its signature shortly thereafter, bringing the number down to 36. As of July 27, Xinhua reported more countries signed the letter, bringing the tally to 50, but the letter has not been made public so we do not include these additional countries.

[18]Note that there are minor discrepancies between Kastner (2016) and what we report here on the number supporters on the ASL and Tibet. This is due to differences in missingness in the independent variables. Kastner (2016) reports the counts after listwise deletion of incomplete observations. Figure 1 reports raw counts.

[19]Though 70 countries issued statements acknowledging at least one tenet of China's approach to the dispute, only 9 of them reaffirmed their support in an official statement.



Figure 1: *Top panel*: The leftmost bar plot shows total counts of support by case. The main bar plot displays country counts across cases where the dumbbells below the x-axis indicate case combinations. *Bottom panel*: average correlation between the three main indices across all cases stratified by supportive countries (dark grey) and all countries (light grey).

the executive. Rather than focusing solely on institutional elements of democracy, this measure also captures a country's adherence to protecting individual and minority rights and is a key normative feature of the Western liberal world order.

`Economic Integration` captures how enmeshed a country is in the global economic system based on three elements. The first is 5-year lagged average trade flows normalized by GDP. To create this measure, we take five years of import and export flows from the years preceding each event, sum and normalize them by GDP, and then take the overall average. Although trade flows are somewhat biased toward small, powerhouse trade-based economies like Singapore, this measure captures how much a country is benefiting from current trade networks. The second element is average inward foreign direct investment normalized by GDP which we create following the same procedure as trade flows. It proxies how financial markets view the economic potential of a country

and whether the country benefits from current investment arrangements. The last element is the log average gross national income per capita (also 5-year lag) to capture a country's overall wealth (a rough proxy for how much a country is benefiting from the contemporary international economic order). Economic integration is the average of all three elements after rescaling them to $[0, 1]$. All trade statistics come from the UN's UNCTADstat database while population figures and GDP come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.

`Security Hierarchy` measures a country's reliance on the United States for security and draws closely on Lake (2009). Three underlying variables inform the index: arms imports from the United States, the number of active duty US troops stationed in country, and significance of defense treaty with US (if present). Arms imports come from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Arms Transfers Database, and we sum the 5 previous years of imports and then take the natural log.[20] For troop information, we use the US Department of Defense's Active Duty Military Personnel data for the previous year and take the natural log. Correlates of War Formal Alliances (v4.1) data set (Gibler 2009) supplies the defense treaty data.[21] Similar to Lake (2009), we develop a measure of how substantively important a treaty with America is to a country by tallying the total number of other defense treaties each country has, rescaling these counts to $[0, 1]$ for all countries, and then subtracting this from 1 for all countries that have a treaty with the US. All others are assigned a 0. Thus, countries with a large number of defense treaties that are independent of the US will end up with a low significance score. The final index is the average of all three elements after rescaling the troops and arms sales to $[0, 1]$.

Though these variables are 'sticky', our theory rests on the fact that these constructs matter differently under different circumstances rather than hinging on significant temporal variation. It is thus imperative that each index captures an independent feature of the international order. The correlation plots in Figure 1 (bottom) verify this. As we

[20] `http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php`

[21] Although the COW data is only current to 2008, it is the most comprehensive data that is readily available. Defense treaties are a rather rare, slow changing feature of international relations, so we believe this does not pose a major issue.

can see, none of the indices are highly correlated nor do the correlations differ much in the supporter subset. Moving from left to right across the bottom panel, the Pearson correlation coefficients for all observations are 0.37, 0.40, and 0.44, respectively.

Controls

The literature contains at least three alternative explanations for which countries will support a rising power like China. The first explanation is that economic dependence fosters foreign policy acquiescence either through fear or natural convergence of interests (Hirschman 1945; Baldwin 1985). Although tests of this theory in relation to China (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013; Kastner 2016; Strüver 2016) find mixed results, it is still a plausible explanation. `Export Dependence` and `Import Dependence` are measured as exports and imports to China as a percentage of GDP averaged over a 5-year lag period, respectively. Data come from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. The second explanation is that exposure to China's growing military power could lead to accommodation.[22] We measure the `Distance` in kilometers between a country's capital and Beijing and Composite Index of National Capability (`CINC`) scores (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972). To account for the relational nature of power dynamics and role of geography in power projection, we calculate a `CINC Ratio` between each country and China and also interact the ratio with distance. The third explanation is that idiosyncratic factors across each case drive support. In the case of the ASL, Tibet, and Xinjiang, it is possible that a country's decision to support China is driven by its own domestic separatist group concerns. Policy-makers and media have also conjectured that countries' support for China's tactics in Xinjiang is being driven by their desire to secure favorable terms for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Thus, `Secessionist` measures the average number of active separatist groups in a country over the past five years (Sambanis et al. 2018) and `BRI` ordinally ranks the level of official that a country sent to China's May 2017 BRI Forum from 0 to 3 (Broz et al. 2018).

[22]See, for instance, Ross 2006. See also Lake (2017) on the possible emergence of an Asian security hierarchy with China at the apex.

Table 1: *Summary of Main Theoretical Expectations*

	Statement	IV	Sign
H1	Economic Integration $\downarrow \implies$ Support $\uparrow$	Econ. Integration	-
H2	Position in Security Hierarchy $\uparrow \implies$ Support $\downarrow$	Sec. Hierarchy	-
H3	Adherence to Liberal Norms $\downarrow \implies$ Support $\uparrow$	Lib. Norms	-

Expectations and Models

We hypothesize that a country's position in three of the pillars of the current international system—economic order, US security hierarchy, and liberal political normative regime—independently influence the likelihood that it will support the interests of a rising power, such as China. Table 1 summarizes our three main theoretical expectations. This set of hypotheses is agnostic about the relative importance of each pillar across our cases, and instead aims to test the absolute effect of the three competing 'logics.' To model the absolute effects, we utilize logistic regression given the binary nature of `Support`. The predictors are standardized to be centered at zero and have a standard deviation of one. Differences in the scales on which variables are measured can adversely impact model convergence. This also aids in the comparability of the coefficients.

Hypothesis 4 addresses the relative strength of each order (vis-à-vis one another) across cases. We expect in cases where China's behavior more directly challenges a given order, a country's position within that order will exhibit a relatively stronger effect on the likelihood of support vis-à-vis its observed effect in other cases. We *a priori* categorized each case according to which dimension was, in our view, most directly threatened. They are as follows.

The crackdown in Tibet and China's policies in Xinjiang embody challenges to the protection of individual liberties and minority rights, freedom from political repression, and more broadly, the international human rights regime. We therefore, expect the effect of liberal political norms to be relatively stronger in these cases. The ASL and SCS Tribunal both pose a more salient threat to US security interests in the region. The ASL

threatened the use of force against Taiwan, for whom the US is a security guarantor, and risked further destabilizing the region during a period of already tense cross-straits relations. The SCS Tribunal was a key test of the maritime territorial provisions in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which forms the legal bedrock of the US's naval operations throughout the region and which China has been in the process of re-interpreting and implementing to better suit its maritime interests (Kardon 2018). In these two cases, we expect position in the US security hierarchy to be a relatively stronger predictor.

To gauge relative effects, we aggregate all four cases into a single data set and fit a Bayesian non-nested logistic regression indexed by each case. Unaccounted for covariance is a concern given we are measuring roughly the same set of countries at four different points in time and positional change along each dimension is, by nature, sluggish. By partially pooling the cases, we can estimate the difference in effect size of our desired parameters between groups (events) while accounting for the covariance structure. The model is of the general form:

$$Y \sim Bern(\pi)$$
$$\pi = g(\alpha + \mathbf{X}\beta + \mathbf{Zb})$$

where α is a global intercept, $\mathbf{X}$ is the matrix of variables whose effects are common across all cases, $\mathbf{Z}$ is the matrix of predictors allowed to vary across cases, and $g(\cdot)$ is the logit link function. The three order indices are allowed to vary by case as is the intercept while the set of common controls are presumed fixed.[23] We employ STAN (Carpenter et al. 2017) to sample from the model.

[23]For full model specification including prior specifications, see Appendix B in the supplementary materials.

Absolute Effects

Table 2 displays four panels, one for each case, with two models each. The first model only includes the three order variables. The second model adds the controls. Figure 2 plots the estimates of model 2 with 90 and 95% confidence intervals. Looking first at the table, we see that the coefficients on the order variables are consistent across both models, though they are tend to be slightly attenuated in model 2 once the full controls are included. The only exception to this is for economic integration in the Tibet case. The effect size increases from -0.087 in model 1 to -0.107 in model 2.

To summarize the initial results, `Liberal Norms` exert a statistically significant, negative effect on the likelihood of support in the ASL, Tibet, and Xinjiang cases. `Economic Integration` also exhibits a significant negative effect in the Tibet and SCS cases, though the effect size is smaller than liberal norms. In no case does `Security Hierarchy` effectively predict support for China. While these results are consistent across both models, they do not account for the fact that we are testing multiple hypotheses on the same sample in each case which increases the probability of Type I error. One way to account for this is to adjust confidence intervals according to a Bonferroni correction (Dunn 1961) where the new confidence level is given by $1 - \frac{\alpha}{m}$ where α is the significance level and m is the number of multiple comparisons. Given an $\alpha = 0.95$ and $m = 3$, the adjusted confidence interval is $0.98\overline{3}$. Once this is taken into consideration, only `Liberal Norms` retains significance in the ASL, Tibet, and Xinjiang Cases. `Economic Integration` survives the correction in the SCS case for model 1, but does not survive once the controls are included.

With this in mind, we cautiously interpret how the findings reflect on our hypothesis, especially given that we are testing against a null hypotheses that assumes zero effect size. Although one might expect economic marginalization to matter across cases, as supporting China on these issues is a relatively cheap way to curry favor with Beijing, it only appears to matter on Tibet and the SCS and does not pass tougher scrutiny after a

Table 2: *Logit Results of Support Cases*

	1		2	
	Coef.	Std. Error	Coef.	Std. Error
ASL				
Liberal Norms	-0.190***	(0.043)	-0.178***	(0.046)
Econ. Integration	-0.081	(0.042)	-0.090	(0.047)
Security Hierarchy	-0.045	(0.041)	-0.038	(0.049)
Import Dep. (GDP)			0.061	(0.036)
Export Dep. (GDP)			0.025	(0.038)
Distance			0.023	(0.039)
CINC Ratio			0.007	(0.043)
CINC Ratio X Distance			0.043	(0.043)
Secessionist			-0.013	(0.043)
AIC	187.306		192.183	
N	155		153	
Tibet				
Liberal Norms	-0.136**	(0.044)	-0.123**	(0.046)
Econ. Integration	-0.087*	(0.043)	-0.107*	(0.046)
Security Hierarchy	-0.010	(0.042)	0.011	(0.048)
Import Dep. (GDP)			0.044	(0.037)
Export Dep. (GDP)			0.000	(0.037)
Distance			-0.081*	(0.040)
CINC Ratio			-0.026	(0.045)
CINC Ratio X Distance			0.018	(0.045)
Secessionist			-0.017	(0.046)
AIC	205.368		203.815	
N	157		154	
SCS				
Liberal Norms	0.020	(0.022)	0.022	(0.023)
Econ. Integration	-0.055**	(0.021)	-0.051*	(0.022)
Security Hierarchy	-0.016	(0.020)	-0.005	(0.023)
Import Dep. (GDP)			0.067***	(0.019)
Export Dep. (GDP)			-0.011	(0.020)
Distance			0.001	(0.020)
CINC Ratio			-0.011	(0.021)
CINC Ratio X Distance			0.004	(0.020)
AIC	-5.817		-5.275	
N	151		147	
Xinjiang				
Liberal Norms	-0.237***	(0.035)	-0.220***	(0.038)
Econ. Integration	-0.024	(0.033)	-0.032	(0.036)
Security Hierarchy	0.045	(0.032)	0.060	(0.040)
Import Dep. (GDP)			0.002	(0.031)
Export Dep. (GDP)			0.028	(0.034)
Distance			-0.028	(0.036)
CINC Ratio			-0.040	(0.040)
CINC Ratio X Distance			0.029	(0.037)
Secessionist			0.050	(0.039)
BRI			-0.016	(0.035)
AIC	132.349		141.163	
N	152		148	

Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05



Figure 2: *Model 3 Logistic Regression Point Estimates.*

Bonferroni correction. Despite the potential benefits China offers such as foreign aid and investment, countries do not appear to be unconditionally supporting Beijing for economic reasons but rather doing so under specific, instrumental circumstances. Hypothesis three finds support in three of four cases. In short, the degree to which a country adheres to liberal norms most consistently predicts whether it will back China. This may be because all of the dependent variable cases primarily pose a challenge to some aspect of the liberal order. However, even though both the ASL and China's approach to the SCS affected US security interests in East Asia, security hierarchy did not matter in these instances. Indeed, hypothesis two is not supported in any of the cases.

For a better sense of the substantive effects, we convert the log-odds coefficient on liberal norms into probabilities. A one unit increase in this dimension away from its mean translates into a -4.4, -3.1, and -5.5 percentage point change in the probability of supporting China for the ASL, Tibet, and Xinjiang cases, respectively. Because the scale of the order variables is arbitrary and has been standardized to have mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1, it makes more sense to think of this movement in terms of

country profiles. On the ASL, this is tantamount to comparing Guatemala to Mauritius; on Tibet, Thailand to Latvia; and on Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan to France. The between case variation in which countries occupy similar spots is striking. In 2004, Mauritius occupies a similar score on the Liberal dimension as does France in 2017. One cannot make firm over time comparisons because these dimensions are not anchored and there is temporal drift, but this variation does challenge the criticism that these dimensions are too temporally static to be of any predictive utility.

We took a number of additional steps to ensure the robustness of these findings. First, we ran seven different permutations of model 3, substituting liberal norms with four alternatives from the V-Dem data set, replacing the other two indices with each of their constitutive terms, and decomposing the average trade dependence variables into their 5-year lags. The key findings hold across all models. Table A.1 in the supplementary materials contains these results. We also check whether missingness of the independent variables is correlated with support and thus biasing the results. Across all four cases, we test the difference in proportion of missing observations for every variable between supporters and non-supporters. Figure A.1 in the supplementary materials plots the results and shows that missingness is only a potential issue for the economic index in the case of Tibet and Xinjiang. Yet, missing economic data is usually associated with extremely marginalized or pariah states like North Korea. If anything, missingness on this variable is biasing the results towards zero, meaning our estimates are conservative. Thus, the true effect size of economic order may be larger than we have identified.

Relative Effects

Figure 3 plots the difference in posterior distributions between cases for the random effects of liberal norms and security hierarchy predictors in the left and right panels.[24] Thick and thin bars indicate 90 and 95 percent Bayesian credible intervals, respectively. Precise posterior estimates and credible intervals are presented in Table B.2 in the sup-

[24]We do not present the relative strength of the liberal economic order because it is not clearly challenged in any of the cases, but the results are in the replication files.



Figure 3: *Casewise Differences in Predictor Random Effects.*

plementary materials. In frequentist terms, the random effects **Zb** can be thought of as how much a given predictor varies from the global mean by group. Thus, the difference between the random effects provide an estimate of the relative effect of each variable. Remember that increasing values for each index represents deeper integration, so negative values are commensurate our expectation.

The results partially support our expectations. For liberal norms, the Tibetan crackdown and Xinjiang Repression cases do exhibit more negative random effects when compared to the SCS tribunal and their 95% credible interval (one-tailed) excludes 0 in both instances. For the former and latter, the estimated differences are -0.831 and -1.373 with 97.7% and 99.8% of the posterior samples falling below 0, respectively. There are no discernible differences when compared to the ASL. In fact, the random effect of liberal norms for ASL tends to be slightly stronger, if anything, than for the Tibet Crackdown. This is driven by the unexpectedly large role of liberal norms in the ASL case, as evidenced by the estimates in Table 2. One possible interpretation of these findings is that we have misclassified the ASL as challenging US security interests in the region. More generally, this exercise reflects one challenge of applying a more nuanced, conditional theory of support given the multidimensional nature of international relations. We discuss

this further in the conclusion.

For security hierarchy, the median of each posterior density has the expected negative sign; however, the certainty of the differences varies significantly across cases. When compared to Xinjiang repression, we find a difference in random effect size for security hierarchy of -0.438 and -0.398 for the ASL and SCS Tribunal cases, respectively. In the former comparison, 90.5% of posterior samples are less than 0 while, in the latter, 84.2% of samples are smaller than 0. The two remaining comparisons have much less pronounced differences in random effects. In contrast to the ASL and liberal norms, we believe this is likely due to the weaker-than-expected effect of security hierarchy in predicting states' decision to back China in the ASL and SCS cases rather than security hierarchy playing an outsized role in the Tibet case.

Predicting Support

Although we are ultimately interested in a model that explains who supports a rising power, a good model should also balance backwards explanation with forward prediction. Our theory aims to advance both fronts. In terms of statistical modeling, explanation and prediction represent different and, often, competing objectives (Shmueli 2010) in which we trade internal for external validity. As a final test, we therefore train a set of six models on the first three cases and test their predictive accuracy using the Xinjiang case as held-out data. In a sense, this test is "real-time" since the situation in Xinjiang is still unfolding.

Two of the six models test the utility of conditional versus unconditional theory by comparing partial- and complete-pooling models. The former lets the main independent predictors vary at group level, while the latter does not. To group similar events, we index the cases according to which dimension of the international order we expect them to most threaten.[25] We treat the Xinjiang data as a challenge to liberal norms, which

[25]We recode the ASL as a challenge to liberal norms rather than US Security Hierarchy to match he initial model results.



Figure 4: *Xinjiang Repression Classification Test ROC Plots*

conforms to *a priori* expectations, despite us having already having seen the results in Table 2. The remaining four models test different permutations of the independent and control variables. After fitting the models, we get a posterior predictive distribution by conditioning on the unseen data. We use the mean prediction for all analyses.

Figure 4 plots Receiver-Operator Curves (ROC) for each model which display the trade-off between false positive and true positive prediction rates. A perfect classifier hugs the top left corner and has an area under the curve (AUC) of 1 while a poor classifier falls near or on the diagonal. Note three findings. First, across all models, the partial-pooling model performs the best with an AUC of 0.806. Second, comparing the partial- and complete-pooling models, although the two have very similar AUC, the former gains a slight edge by achieving better true positive rates while holding false positive rates constant. The advantage becomes apparent around false positive rates of about 15% and higher. Third, adding any of the order variables provides substantial predictive lift over the controls-only model, especially Liberal Norms, which increases the AUC by 0.18 or 35% over the controls-only baseline of .518, on average.[26]

[26]Individual variable AUC contributions were calculated by treating the set of models as a system of equations and solving for each term. See Appendix C in the supplemental materials for the solution and additional classification statistics.

Overall, the prediction results provide strong support for conceptualizing support as a function of embeddedness in different elements of the international order as opposed to mere economic dependence or power differentials and minor support for a conditional logic. One might challenge this perspective, arguing the models are poor from a predictive standpoint—none of them achieve a Kappa value (improvement over the base rate) greater than 0.4 and generally suffer from low precision. However, given that we have little training data, few features, face significant class imbalances, and do not employ any mitigation techniques (i.e. re/upsampling, ensembling, hyperparameter tuning, feature disaggregation), the partial-pooling model performs quite well over the baseline and remains interpretable.

Conclusions

Countries across the world have not responded to China's rise in a uniform way. Rather, across a range of issue areas, some countries have been more willing than others to openly support Chinese interests. Building on recent studies, we argue that countries marginalized from different dimensions of the contemporary US-led international order should be more likely to welcome the rise of a new great power, like China, that might in the future challenge existing norms. For instance, countries that reject norms associated with the liberal political development order, such as human rights norms, may wish to curry favor from a rising China that could use its clout to shield them from sanction. Countries that are marginalized from the current liberal international economic order may view a rising China as a potential economic opportunity, and consequently will be reluctant to take steps that might put economic ties with China at risk. And countries residing outside the US security hierarchy may have reason to welcome and support the rise of a new great power that could challenge US primacy. We further hypothesized that marginalization from a particular dimension of order would be an especially strong predictor of state support for China in instances where Chinese actions directly challenges that dimension of order. To assess these arguments, we examined cross-national variation in how countries responded to China's 2005 passage of an anti-secession law directed

against Taiwan; to Beijing's 2008 crackdown in Tibet; to the 2016 South China Sea Tribunal; and to recent PRC actions in Xinjiang.

The findings suggest integration into the liberal political development order has been the most consistent predictor of whether a particular country is willing to support China's interests (our measure of integration into the liberal political development order was a significant covariate of support for China in three of our four cases and provided the largest AUC boost over a pure controls in our predictive check). Integration into the liberal international economic order also appears to play a role in a country's behavior. However, the support for this is far more tentative and contracts with previous findings on the importance of economic incentives in fostering support (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013; Kastner 2016; Strüver 2016). Integration into the US-led security hierarchy never emerges as a meaningful predictor of individual country support for China in our four cases. In analyzing the relative effect on different dimensions across cases, we find mixed results. On the one hand, integration into the liberal political development order is an especially salient predictor of national behavior in instances (the crackdown in Tibet and repression in Xinjiang) directly related to human rights norms, as expected. On the other hand, the effect of integration into the liberal political development order is relatively stronger for the ASL than for the Tibetan crackdown, contrary to expectations. Apart from this exception, however, the directions of the relative effects match our expectations in seven out of eight instances. Predictive checks for Xinjiang further lend credence to the utility of employing a conditional model that allows the effect of different dimensions to vary across cases (essentially over time).

This article makes two main contributions. The first is empirical. While anecdotal or qualitative data abounds, there is a relative dearth of consistently collected, large-N data about who accommodates China on issues it cares about. This partially explains the reliance on measures like UNGA voting in the literature (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013; Liao and McDowell 2016; Strüver 2016; Davis et al. 2019). By coding two new cases, we are able to test accommodation in situations where Chinese interests are at

stake and challenge the status quo. We also provide new data for researchers to examine. The second contribution is theoretical. Once we shift away from nebulous, aggregated measures like UNGA voting, one can see that a conditional, dimensions-based model better explains and predicts state behavior than a model purely based on factors like trade flows or military power projection.

Nonetheless, our model is not without shortcomings. If one *a priori* misspecifies the dimension most at stake in a given case, predictions can be biased at the global level. For instance, the unexpectedly large influence of the liberal political dimension in shaping responses to the ASL suggests we misclassified it as challenging US security interests. This challenge of specifying dimensions is further challenged by China itself. When China's behavior challenges the status quo, it actively advances a preferred interpretation of its behavior—internationally via foreign media and bilaterally through diplomatic channels—in attempts to bolster support. Thus, other countries' interpretations of which dimension is most at stake can vary even within a given case. This is where a Bayesian framework is advantageous. In this paper, we merely applied an exclusive, binary classification scheme, yet future designs should employ more complex prior structures that simultaneously encode cases in multiple dimensions of order and to varying degrees. Finally, despite the difficult nature of collecting data on individual instances of support for China, future work should strive to keep gathering this type of data so that we can improve our understanding of and ability to predict variation in accommodative behavior.

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Appendix A Supporting Facts

This appendix documents a range of supportive facts for the main analysis.

Missingness by Case and Variable

Figure A.1 displays the correlation between missingness in each of the predictor variables and the outcome variable, `accommodation`, by case. Across all cases, `Economic Integration` exhibits the highest levels of missingness which also tends to be correlated with accommodation to a higher degree. As one can see, the difference in missingness between accommodating and non-accommodating countries is significantly different at the 95% confidence level in the Tibetan Crackdown and Xinjiang repression cases. Though this correlation could potentially induce bias into our estimates, we choose not to explicitly impute values for two reasons.



Figure A.1: *Relationship between Missing Observations and Accommodation.*

First, the missingness mechanism is not easily discernible. The missing values in the index are a product of missingness in the underlying constitutive terms which are drawn from either the IMF or World Bank. Missing data often comes from countries such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Eritrea. On the one hand, these types of countries are highly marginalized in international institutions and thus less likely to report data. If so, they can be treated as *missing at random* and ignored because the remaining predictors control for the probability of missingness (Gelman and Hill 2007: 530). On the other hand, the missing values may be a function of themselves. In other words, rather than report dismal trade and finance statistics or potentially expose illicit, sanctioned flows (i.e DPRK), these countries intentionally censor their own data. In general, the *censoring* can be mitigated by including sufficient information in other predictors, which we believe we have done. Second, any bias would pull the estimate toward zero due to the correlation between marginalization, missingness and accommodation. Our estimates are thus likely to be conservative.

Additional Model Fits

Table A.1 presents the results from seven model fits in addition to the three presented in the main body of the paper. If an index exhibited significant and consistent effects, then we substituted it for each of its constitutive terms and reran the models to see if the results still held and which, if any, constitutive terms are driving the index's effect. In the South China Sea case, we also decomposed the five-year lagged average trade dependence variables into individual years. The benchmark is model 3 in Table 2.

One can see the results are largely robust to decomposing the indices and, for `Liberal Norms`, substitution for closely related indices. There are two noticeable exceptions from the benchmark. First, in two cases, ASL and Tibet, `Economic Integration` overcomes the significance threshold when paired with `Freedom Association` and `Freedom Expression` in contrast with the benchmark. This is likely because the correlation between economic integration and liberal democracies is washed out when the former is

Table A.1: Logistic Regression Robustness Checks

	1		2		3		4		5		6		7	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
ASL														
Liberal Norms									-0.201***	0.043	-0.181***	0.043	-0.151**	0.046
Liberal Democracy	-0.216***	0.048												
Freedom Association					-0.135**	0.044								
Freedom Expression			-0.145**	0.044										
Egalitarianism							-0.109*	0.048						
Econ. Integration	-0.059	0.049	-0.139**	0.045	-0.135**	0.046	-0.097	0.052						
Avg. GNI (ln)													-0.098	0.053
Avg. IFDI / GDP											-0.043	0.039		
Avg. Trade Flows / GDP									-0.059	0.042				
Security Hierarchy	-0.017	0.049	-0.033	0.050	-0.044	0.050	-0.072	0.049	-0.062	0.046	-0.077	0.046	-0.025	0.051
Import Dep. (GDP)	0.056	0.035	0.051	0.037	0.064	0.037	0.066	0.037	0.069	0.036	0.079*	0.036	0.060	0.037
Export Dep. (GDP)	0.017	0.037	0.035	0.038	0.042	0.038	0.026	0.040	0.032	0.040	0.022	0.037	0.026	0.037
Distance	0.037	0.039	0.029	0.040	0.037	0.042	-0.017	0.039	0.023	0.039	0.059	0.038	0.038	0.038
CINC Ratio	0.003	0.043	-0.001	0.044	0.000	0.044	0.006	0.045	0.003	0.044	0.019	0.044	0.016	0.044
CINC Ratio X Distance	0.045	0.042	0.044	0.044	0.047	0.044	0.046	0.045	0.046	0.043	0.031	0.044	0.038	0.043
Secessionist	-0.002	0.043	-0.009	0.044	-0.007	0.044	-0.019	0.045	-0.001	0.043	0.000	0.043	-0.010	0.044
AIC	187.154		196.097		197.513		201.768		198.672		204.668		207.159	
N	153		153		153		153		156		158		161	
Tibet														
Liberal Norms									-0.150***	0.044	-0.163***	0.043	-0.116**	0.044
Liberal Democracy	-0.161***	0.047												
Freedom Association					-0.131**	0.044								

Freedom Expression			-0.148***	0.044										
Egalitarianism							-0.117*	0.049						
Econ. Integration	-0.078	0.048	-0.130**	0.044	-0.131**	0.044	-0.081	0.052						
Avg. GNI (ln)													-0.141**	0.051
Avg. IFDI / GDP											-0.039	0.036		
Avg. Trade Flows / GDP									-0.031	0.042				
Security Hierarchy	0.020	0.048	0.018	0.047	0.004	0.047	-0.018	0.047	-0.023	0.046	-0.024	0.046	0.036	0.049
Import Dep. (GDP)	0.045	0.036	0.043	0.036	0.051	0.036	0.053	0.037	0.060	0.037	0.054	0.036	0.029	0.037
Export Dep. (GDP)	-0.009	0.037	-0.002	0.036	0.004	0.037	-0.011	0.039	-0.005	0.040	-0.015	0.037	-0.012	0.036
Distance	-0.063	0.040	-0.060	0.040	-0.055	0.042	-0.102*	0.039	-0.056	0.040	-0.063	0.039	-0.075	0.038
CINC Ratio	-0.022	0.045	-0.025	0.045	-0.026	0.045	-0.020	0.046	-0.023	0.047	-0.022	0.045	-0.024	0.044
CINC Ratio X Distance	0.016	0.045	0.010	0.045	0.016	0.045	0.015	0.046	0.010	0.046	0.018	0.045	0.019	0.045
Secessionist	-0.011	0.045	-0.019	0.045	-0.015	0.046	-0.021	0.047	-0.003	0.047	0.004	0.045	-0.019	0.045
AIC	199.175		199.480		202.064		205.160		215.178		211.118		210.726	
N	154		154		154		154		157		158		161	
SCS														
Liberal Norms	0.012	0.022	0.006	0.022	0.029	0.022	0.023	0.023	0.021	0.023	0.026	0.024	0.007	0.021
Econ. Integration							-0.056*	0.022	-0.053*	0.021	-0.050*	0.021	-0.052*	0.020
Avg. GNI (ln)					-0.066**	0.025								
Avg. IFDI / GDP			-0.013	0.019										
Avg. Trade Flows / GDP	-0.035	0.020												
Security Hierarchy	-0.018	0.022	-0.020	0.023	0.010	0.025							-0.001	0.021
US Troops (ln)									0.005	0.022				
Defense Treaties											-0.016	0.022		
Arms							0.018	0.024						
Import Dep. (GDP)	0.072***	0.019	0.072***	0.019	0.058**	0.019	0.067***	0.019	0.067***	0.019	0.066***	0.019		
Import Dep. (L1)													-0.093	0.058
Import Dep. (L2)													0.229**	0.086

Import Dep. (L3)													0.315***	0.087
Import Dep. (L4)													-0.311**	0.118
Import Dep. (L5)													-0.076	0.064
Export Dep. (GDP)	-0.012	0.020	-0.018	0.020	-0.011	0.019	-0.011	0.020	-0.011	0.020	-0.012	0.020		
Export Dep. (L1)													0.206**	0.078
Export Dep. (L2)													-0.320**	0.119
Export Dep. (L3)													0.128	0.094
Export Dep. (L4)													-0.046	0.065
Export Dep. (L5)													0.029	0.061
Distance	0.001	0.020	0.009	0.020	0.002	0.019	0.003	0.020	0.002	0.020	0.002	0.020	0.005	0.019
CINC Ratio	-0.010	0.022	-0.003	0.021	-0.009	0.021	-0.024	0.024	-0.015	0.021	-0.009	0.020	-0.012	0.019
CINC Ratio X Distance	0.002	0.020	-0.001	0.020	0.007	0.019	0.005	0.020	0.004	0.020	0.004	0.020	0.002	0.017
AIC	-3.756		-2.187		-9.910		-5.817		-5.303		-5.807		-32.867	
N	148		149		150		147		147		147		145	
Xinjiang														
Liberal Norms									-0.231***	0.036	-0.231***	0.035	-0.236***	0.037
Liberal Democracy	-0.215***	0.040												
Freedom Association					-0.209***	0.037								
Freedom Expression			-0.163***	0.039										
Egalitarianism							-0.161***	0.043						
Econ. Integration	-0.015	0.038	-0.071	0.037	-0.067	0.035	-0.018	0.043						
Avg. GNI (ln)													-0.018	0.042
Avg. IFDI / GDP											-0.019	0.031		
Avg. Trade Flows / GDP									-0.033	0.033				
Security Hierarchy	0.061	0.041	0.044	0.042	0.034	0.040	0.025	0.043	0.055	0.039	0.051	0.039	0.061	0.043
Import Dep. (GDP)	-0.001	0.032	0.003	0.033	0.004	0.031	0.014	0.033	0.002	0.031	0.005	0.031	-0.003	0.032
Export Dep. (GDP)	0.026	0.035	0.043	0.036	0.028	0.035	0.033	0.037	0.034	0.032	0.028	0.033	0.034	0.032
Distance	-0.019	0.037	-0.028	0.038	-0.006	0.037	-0.056	0.038	-0.028	0.036	-0.024	0.035	-0.022	0.035

CINC Ratio	-0.037	0.041	-0.044	0.042	-0.033	0.040	-0.031	0.043	-0.042	0.040	-0.038	0.040	-0.038	0.040
CINC Ratio X Distance	0.030	0.037	0.039	0.039	0.031	0.037	0.024	0.039	0.028	0.037	0.030	0.037	0.029	0.037
Secessionist	0.044	0.040	0.056	0.041	0.050	0.040	0.034	0.042	0.048	0.039	0.054	0.039	0.049	0.039
BRI	-0.010	0.036	-0.023	0.037	-0.014	0.036	-0.014	0.038	-0.023	0.035	-0.021	0.035	-0.020	0.035
AIC	145.287		156.276		143.625		159.697		142.659		141.857		143.606	
N	148		148		148		148		150		149		151	

Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

included alongside liberal norms. Second, in the case of the SCS, import and export dependence become inconsistent when the lag term is decomposed, casting doubt on their validity in the benchmark.

Appendix B Non-nested GLM Specification and Posterior Predictive Checks

This appendix outlines the full Bayesian non-nested logistic regression model specification and provides additional posterior information.

Model Specification

We write the model using the indices i for country and j for accommodation case:

$$
\begin{aligned}
y &\sim Bern(\pi) \\
\pi &= \frac{1}{1+e^{-z}} \\
z &= \alpha_{j[i]} + \beta^0_{j[i]} Lib.Norms + \beta^1_{j[i]} Econ.Integration + \\
&\quad \beta^2_{j[i]} Sec.Hierarchy + \beta^3_i CINCRatio + \beta^4_i Distance + \\
&\quad \beta^5_i CINCRatio \times Distance + \beta^6_i Imp.Dep. + \\
&\quad \beta^7_i Exp.Dep. + \varepsilon_i \\
\alpha_j &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 10) \\
\beta_j &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 2.5) \\
\varepsilon_i &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, \mathbf{\Sigma})
\end{aligned}
$$

The covariance matrix $\mathbf{\Sigma}$ is decomposed into correlation matrices and variances. The latter is further decomposed into the product of a simplex vector and the trace of the matrix. The trace is set equal to the product of the order of the matrix and the square of a scale parameter. In STAN, the prior on this covariance matrix is called a `decov` function. For further details, see Gabry and Goodrich (2018).

Posterior Information

Figure B.2 shows posterior predictions for two test statistics: the proportion of accommodation (mean μ_y) and the standard deviation of accommodation (sd σ_y). As one can see, the predicted test values are normally distributed and center at the true value. The only exception is the standard deviation for the ASL. Table B.2 provides the underlying data for Figure 3 in the main analysis.



Figure B.2: *Non-nested Logistic Regression Posterior Predictive Checks*

Table B.2: *Estimated Posterior Differences in Random Effects*

Case Comparisons	**Point Estimate**	**Cred. Int. (95%)**	**Cred. Int. (90%)**	**Samples < 0 (Percent)**
Liberal Norms				
Tibet Crackdown - Anti-Secession Law	0.152	[-0.382, 0.75]	[-0.299, 0.64]	28.52
Tibet Crackdown - South China Sea Tribunal	-0.831	[-1.88, -0.011]	[-1.678, -0.129]	97.68
Xinjiang Repression - Anti-Secession Law	-0.366	[-1.081, 0.286]	[-0.963, 0.188]	85.24
Xinjiang Repression - South China Sea Tribunal	-1.373	[-2.519, -0.37]	[-2.335, -0.513]	99.76
Security Hierarchy				
Anti-Secession Law - Tibet Crackdown	-0.185	[-0.773, 0.295]	[-0.667, 0.211]	76.82
Anti-Secession Law - Xinjiang Repression	-0.438	[-1.11, 0.186]	[-1.01, 0.094]	90.48
South China Sea Tribunal - Tibet Crackdown	-0.156	[-1.177, 0.575]	[-0.99, 0.456]	66.14
South China Sea Tribunal - Xinjiang Repression	-0.398	[-1.484, 0.367]	[-1.276, 0.255]	84.22

Appendix C Xinjiang Classification Results

This appendix presents the underlying statistics used to support the prediction section in the main results.

Individual Variable AUC Contribution Solution

The model fits and their respective AUC estimate admit a system of equations from which we can isolate the AUC average contribution of any one variable, given that each is a restricted version of the full model:

$$C = 0.518 \tag{1}$$
$$E + S + C = 0.665 \tag{2}$$
$$L + E + C = 0.785 \tag{3}$$
$$L + S + C = 0.764 \tag{4}$$

where L is liberal norms, E is economic integration, S is security hierarchy, and C is the set of controls.

After plugging 1 into the other three equations, we first solve for S by subtracting 4 from 3 and rearranging terms, producing:

$$E = S + 0.021 \tag{5}$$

and then plugging 5 into 2:

$$2S + 0.531 = 0.665$$
$$S = 0.067$$

Now, solving E is a matter of plugging S into 5:

$$E = 0.067 + 0.021$$

$$E = 0.088$$

L can be solved either by plugging E into 3 or S into 4, rendering:

$$L = 0.179$$

Classifier Performance Statistics

Table C.3 provides prediction performance statistics for the models presented in Figure 4 of the main text.

Table C.3: Xinjiang Classification Statistics

Model	Accuracy	Kappa	Specificity	Precision	Recall	F1
Pooling						
Partial	0.723	0.372	0.723	0.456	0.722	0.559
Complete	0.764	0.252	0.911	0.524	0.306	0.386
Variables						
Econ. + Sec.	0.730	0.074	0.920	0.357	0.139	0.200
Lib. + Econ.	0.777	0.279	0.929	0.579	0.306	0.400
Lib. + Sec.	0.777	0.262	0.938	0.588	0.278	0.377
Controls	0.757	0.028	0.991	0.500	0.028	0.053